Dimensions of conspiracy theories: toward a unifying framework

Philosophical debate on conspiracy theories divides between particularism, which argues for an evaluation of conspiracy theories on a case by case, and generalism, which treats them — as a class — as inherently irrational. This divide complicates how we interpret empirical research on conspiracy theory belief. Many psychological and social-scientific studies emphasize correlations between conspiracy belief and traits such as narcissism, illusory pattern perception, and paranoia, seemingly supporting a generalist view. Yet conspiracy belief is also widespread in the general population, a fact that is difficult to reconcile with a purely pathological account. A unified explanation of what motivates conspiracy belief is still lacking. I address this gap by introducing a framework that incorporates multiple dimensions of conspiracy belief. The framework identifies three core motivations: group cohesion, cognitive needs, and truth-seeking. I propose that generalists and particularists each focus on different regions of this shared motivational space. I also outline a relatively narrow area within the space where pathological conspiracy belief is best located. Ultimately, however, determining where most conspiracy theories fall — and what reasons people have for endorsing them — remains an empirical question.