Untested Assumptions and Tenuous Evidence: A Critique of the Dual-Process Account of Moral Judgment

The <i>dual-process theory of moral judgment</i> asserts that moral judgments come about because of the operation of either of two independent decision processes, often described as a cognitive/rational process and an intuitive/affective process. In some cases, these processes are seen to operate in competition. We trace the development of this account and highlight how the neural and behavioral evidence almost universally relies on the validity of a series of untested statements that, collectively, we call the <i>dual-process assumptions</i>. We show how these assumptions produce experimental methods that cannot falsify the dual-process account. We provide an in-depth and critical analysis of the kind of neurophysiological and behavioral evidence that has been used to support the theory and conclude that it is tenuous, equivocal, or both.