Jordan, Palestine, and the Politics of Collective Identity

On the morning of November 13, 1966, Israel Defense Force (IDF) units launched a raid on the village of Samu, located 16 kilometers south of Hebron and just 6.5 kilometers from the Israeli border. The IDF stated that Samu had been used as a base for Palestinian attacks targeting Israeli soldiers and civilians. Contrary to Israeli intelligence assessments, Jordanian soldiers arrived during the raid, leading to direct confrontation between the two forces. The ensuing battle resulted in significant casualties on both sides: sixteen Jordanian soldiers and eleven Israelis were killed. The raid also had a devastating impact on the village itself, with over a hundred houses destroyed and several villagers losing their lives during the operation.1The Israeli operation at Samu ignited a firestorm of unrest. Demonstrations and riots erupted across the West Bank, posing a significant threat to the stability of Jordan’s Hashemite regime. The raid severely damaged King Hussein’s trust in the Israeli government. “As far as I am concerned this attack was a complete betrayal,” King Hussein reportedly confided to US Ambassador F. Burns in Amman. This sentiment appears to have reinforced his suspicion that Israel harbored intentions to destabilize his regime and annex the West Bank.2 This profound breakdown of trust between Jordan and Israel became a crucial factor contributing to Jordan’s entry into the 1967 War, as King Hussein no longer trusted Israel’s assurances about its intentions.Some seventy years later, the West Bank remains a central focal point of the conflict between Israel and Jordan. This intricate relationship between Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians—a complex “triangle on the Jordan”—forms the very core of a new book by the Israeli historian Asher Susser, a distinguished Middle East scholar and leading expert on Jordan.This book addresses a critical gap, particularly evident in recent years, for a thorough and serious study of the complex relationship between Jordan, Israel, and Palestine—the three components of this regional triangle. It’s paradoxical that precisely when political tensions between Israel and Jordan are escalating due to the Palestinian conflict, no recent Western publications have systematically illuminated the stances of these countries in light of the prolonged conflict with the Palestinians, nor explained why the “warm peace” has turned cold.3 Therefore, the publication of Susser’s book is more than just an academic endeavor; it’s a pressing necessity to clarify the origins of these intricate relations. Susser achieves this with remarkable success.Comprising eleven chapters, the book can be broadly divided into two main sections. The first, encompassing chapters 1–4, delves into the history of Jordan and the Hashemite regime’s relationship with Palestinians, particularly the Palestinian national movement. The second part, chapters 5–11, explores the evolution of Jordanian identity and the dynamic between the East Bank’s Jordanian elite and the Hashemite monarchy.After a brief exploration of the deep historical links between the West and East Banks of the Jordan, the book focuses on the critical relationship between Abdullah and the Zionists. This alliance was notably driven by their shared opposition to Hajj Amin al-Husseini, the unchallenged leader of the Palestinian national movement. This collaboration yielded a quiet understanding during the 1948 war, which saw the de facto annexation of the West Bank to Jordan, effectively partitioning the territories of the Land of Israel. Paradoxically, this acquisition did not solidify Abdullah’s regime. Instead, it fueled a profound lack of legitimacy among Palestinians and Arabs, ultimately leading to his assassination in Jerusalem in July 1951.At that time, a prevalent belief in Israel and Western nations held that Jordan’s survival as an independent state was untenable, as its “existence as an independent state was intimately related to the personality of Abdallah” (21). However, the United States, recognizing Jordan’s strategic importance, intervened to help stabilize the nation. Commencing in 1958, Israel likewise acknowledged the imperative of preserving Jordan’s sovereignty, actively contributing to this objective by relaying intelligence concerning attempts to undermine the Hashemite regime or execute coups within Jordan.The 1967 war and the subsequent loss of the West Bank significantly invigorated Palestinian nationalism and empowered armed Palestinian organizations, particularly Fatah. The Battle of Karameh in March 1968, widely perceived as a Palestinian victory, further boosted the popularity of fedayeen operating within Jordan. This surge in their influence eroded King Hussein’s control, gradually drawing him into the “Black September” conflict with the PLO in 1970.With the Arab League’s recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in 1974, Jordan’s influence over the West Bank’s future significantly waned, leading to its marginalization. The eruption of the First Intifada, alongside anxieties that Jordan might be perceived as an “alternative homeland” for Palestinians, compelled King Hussein to announce the administrative and legal disengagement from the West Bank in 1988, while still retaining a degree of indirect involvement.While the Oslo Accords undeniably strengthened the PLO, they simultaneously diminished Jordan’s leverage. The 1994 peace agreement with Israel was a strategic move by Jordan, motivated by a clear calculation of its own interests: enhancing internal stability, rekindling American support, and addressing the perceived Palestinian demographic threat. The agreement specifically incorporated clauses designed to avert the large-scale displacement of Palestinians into Jordan. Nevertheless, following King Hussein’s passing in 1999, a growing sense of alienation and distrust permeated the Jordanian public, exacerbated by the stalled peace process and ongoing demographic anxieties.Jordan’s relationship with Palestine has been a defining factor in the development of its collective identity. From the very beginning, key historical events fueled Jordanian concerns about being subsumed by Palestinian national identity. The establishment of the Transjordan emirate, the 1948 annexation of the West Bank, and its subsequent loss in the 1967 War all raised fears that Jordan would be absorbed into the Palestinian national identity.The pivotal “Black September” victory over the fedayeen was crucial for the Hashemite Kingdom’s survival. This event propelled Jordan in the mid-1970s to forge an independent national identity, distinct from Palestinian nationalism. This was driven by a strong desire to differentiate itself and assert that Jordan was not an extension of Palestine. Thus, while the PLO, other Arab leaders, and even some on the Israeli right passionately argued that Jordan was historically part of Palestine and should serve as the Palestinian homeland, Jordan vehemently countered this narrative. It sought to prove that it was not an “alternative homeland” for Palestinians but rather an independent state for the Jordanian people, with its own sovereign national identity and the right to self-determination within its own recognized borders (the East Bank).Susser identifies four primary stages in the development of Jordanian identity (chapter 5). The period of King Abdullah I (until 1948), the period of King Hussein (until 1967), the period of King Hussein (after 1967), and the period of Abdullah II (from 1999). During the initial period, King Abdullah I intentionally avoided fostering a distinct Jordanian national identity. His vision was a “Greater Syria,” with Jordan serving as the foundational step. He leveraged the Hashemite family’s lineage, tracing their descent from the Prophet Muhammad, to legitimize this ambitious political endeavor. Though his grand vision remained unfulfilled, by his assassination in 1951, he had successfully forged Jordan into a cohesive political entity.In contrast to his grandfather, King Hussein viewed Jordan as the definitive and sole homeland. His reign during this period was marked by a concerted effort to consolidate the Hashemite Kingdom. A key focus was ensuring the dominance of the East Bank elite and integrating new Palestinian citizens—both refugees and non-refugees—under the unifying banner of Hashemite Arab nationalism. King Hussein actively sought to diminish any separate Palestinian identity, referring to the “West Bank” instead of “Palestine” and asserting its integral status within Jordan. His declaration, “Jordan is Palestine, and Palestine is Jordan,” underscored the idea that Jordan had inherited Palestine, leaving no room for a distinct Palestinian identity (104–5).Following the 1967 war and the subsequent rise of Palestinian nationalism, King Hussein significantly shifted his approach, beginning to actively cultivate a distinct Jordanian identity. This was evident in various initiatives: There was a deliberate promotion of research into the history and archaeology of Transjordan; national institutions, such as universities, were named after significant battles that occurred in Transjordan (e.g., Yarmuk, Mu’ta); postage stamps emphasized eastern Transjordan landmarks, with Petra, the ancient Nabataean city, emerging as the most prominent and distinct Jordanian symbol; and finally the national slogan changed from “Jordan is Palestine and Palestine is Jordan” to “Jordan is Jordan and Palestine is Palestine,” clearly delineating the two entities.During the reign of King Abdullah II, the concept of a territorial national identity was further reinforced through the adoption of the slogan “Jordan First.” This slogan served to distance Jordan from pan-Arabism and underscore its unique national interests and identity.Susser’s analysis also delves into the issue of the peace treaty with Israel (chapter 7), a topic that greatly preoccupied Jordan. While public opinion polls conducted on the eve of the October 1994 peace treaty signing indicated robust support for negotiations with Israel (approximately 80 percent),4 driven by hopes for a resolution to the Palestinian question and anticipated economic benefits, strong opposition nevertheless emerged within Jordan. This opposition, comprising diverse groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, left-wing parties, and professional unions, deemed the agreement both illegitimate and perilous. Their concerns centered on the potential for Israeli cultural dominance and the permanent resettlement of Palestinian refugees in Jordan, fearing these outcomes would undermine Jordanian national identity.Even with the Jordanian regime’s strong backing for peace with Israel by King Hussein to the point it became known to the Jordanian public as “the king’s peace” (158), normalization with Israel remained unpopular. Professional unions blocked ties with Israel, and public sentiment grew increasingly hostile. This was particularly evident after Rabin’s assassination, the faltering negotiations with the Palestinians, and the deteriorating relationship between King Hussein and Netanyahu, which led to ongoing frustration and clashes between the Jordanian and Israeli governments. Moderate voices in Jordan, who had once supported peace, also withdrew their backing, feeling that advocating for normalization was no longer politically viable. Despite the political and economic failures of normalization, strategic-security cooperation between the two countries remained intact and has even strengthened over the years.The “cold peace” between Israel and Jordan was inherited by King Abdullah II (since 1999), under whose rule the relationship between the two countries has grown increasingly complex. On one hand, Jordan’s strategic dependence on Israel and the United States is undeniable, particularly regarding vital resources like water and energy, and for protection against radical Islamic organizations. On the other hand, the persistent stalemate in negotiations with the Palestinians and ongoing military tensions fuel Jordanian fears of a protracted conflict that could destabilize the internal security of the Hashemite Kingdom. Consequently, Jordan has actively supported diplomatic initiatives in the Middle East aimed at achieving a two-state solution. For Jordan, this is not mere rhetoric but an existential necessity, as it views a resolution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict as crucial for securing its own future stability.A significant turning point in Jordanian–Israeli relations appears to have been the publication of the Trump administration’s “Deal of the Century” peace plan in 2020. In Jordan, this plan was unequivocally perceived as an Israeli-American conspiracy designed to advance the “alternative homeland” agenda. Compounding these anxieties were the increasingly vocal threats from the Israeli far-right, including Prime Minister Netanyahu himself, to annex the West Bank or portions of it. Such threats amplified Jordanian fears of ethnic cleansing that could trigger a mass migration of Palestinians into Jordan, thereby realizing the “alternative homeland” scenario.The war in Gaza (since October 2023) has profoundly exacerbated the crisis between Jordan and Israel, intensifying concerns within Jordan about Israel’s intentions to expel Palestinians from Gaza to either Egypt or Jordan. King Abdullah II explicitly issued stern warnings against such measures. Driven by these existential fears, he has actively worked toward ending the war and advancing a two-state solution, warning that failure could ultimately result in the Palestinian state being established in Jordan.Susser’s book is of great value. While certainly essential for scholars of the Israeli–Arab conflict and, specifically, Israeli–Jordanian–Palestinian relations, it is a must-read for anyone seeking a deeper comprehension of the intricate origins and evolution of the relationships among these three interconnected political entities. The book meticulously illuminates the ideas and positions that shape the Jordanian regime’s approach to both Palestinians and Israel, while simultaneously exploring the perspectives of Israel and the Palestinians towards Jordan.The strength of Susser’s book lies not only in its instructive writing and skillful review of historical events but also in its capacity to offer fresh insights and original conclusions. These derive directly from Susser’s decades-long familiarity with extensive primary and secondary materials concerning Jordan, complemented by his personal acquaintance with key figures active within the kingdom, some of whom are even mentioned in the text.One of Susser’s important observations is that in the early 1970s, Israel passed up a significant chance to forge a strategic understanding with Jordan (59). Following the events of “Black September,” King Hussein of Jordan aimed to capitalize on the PLO’s weakened state to expand his influence in the West Bank. In March 1972, he unveiled his vision for the United Arab Kingdom—a proposed federative union encompassing both banks of the Jordan River.5 The PLO immediately rejected this plan, fearing it was an Israeli–Jordanian plot to establish an alternative leadership in the West Bank. They believed this new leadership would persuade residents to accept the federation as a substitute for Israeli occupation. However, the Israeli government also dismissed the plan just one day after its announcement. Israel’s rejection stemmed from its disinterest in negotiating a withdrawal to the 1967 borders and the redivision of Jerusalem, both of which were King Hussein’s consistent territorial demands.After the Arab League recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in October 1974, King Hussein’s influence in the West Bank waned significantly. Concurrently, the PLO’s status grew, and the prospect of an Israeli–Jordanian settlement gradually disappeared. Yasser Arafat’s cynical remark “Sometimes I think we are lucky to have the Israelis for our enemies. They have saved us many times” (61) underscores Israel’s perceived lack of foresight regarding its relationship with Jordan.A deeply concerning conclusion emerges from the book for those invested in the Middle East’s future: Jordan increasingly perceives Israel not as a reliable strategic ally, as it had been for decades, but as an existential threat. This alarming shift is driven by the activities of the Israeli extreme right and persistent Jordanian fears of the revival of the “alternative homeland” idea, which continues to trouble Jordan even today.