Oman’s Transformation after 1970

Scholars and students of the history and politics of the Sultanate of Oman will in all likelihood acknowledge John E. Peterson as the doyen of their field, being active in the study of this Gulf state for just over fifty years. Oman’s Transformation after 1970 is a follow-up to his 2007 book Oman’s Insurgencies, which provided a detailed historical account of the Jebel Akhdar (1955–59) and Dhofar (1963–c.1976) rebellions and the counter-insurgency campaigns Sultans Said bin Taimur (1932–70) and Qaboos bin Said (1970–2020) waged with British support to defeat them.Over the past fifty-five years, Oman has evolved from an impoverished tribal state under Britain’s informal imperial influence to a fully sovereign, prosperous, but absolute monarchy. It has close ties to the Western powers and other members of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), while playing an active role in regional diplomacy and preserving a semblance of neutrality (Oman has, for example, acted as a mediator between the US and the Islamic Republic of Iran and has tried to broker peace between the Houthis and their enemies in Yemen). Although the Sultanate did experience some internal unrest during the 2011 “Arab Spring” (442–44), it has not only emerged as one of the most stable states in the Middle East but also managed a peaceful transition of power after Qaboos’s death in January 2020. This was not an outcome that contemporary observers would have anticipated in the context of both Qaboos’s seizure of power in a palace coup in July 1970 or his regime’s struggle for survival against insurgent movements both in the Southern province of Dhofar and Northern Oman.1Peterson’s thesis is that during his half-century reign, the late Sultan created a personalized, “Qaboosid” system of rule (9). In contrast with his father’s “neo-traditional” rule—which sought to preserve the established order by enlarging the state’s coercive power—Qaboos presided over the establishment of a “post-traditional” order that incorporated socioeconomic development funded by oil revenues while retaining an absolutist monarchical system (18–22). Given Oman’s impoverishment in 1970, its multiethnic society (including Arabs, Baloch, Zanzibaris, ethnic Dhofaris, and expatriates), the fragility of the state he inherited, and the civil war being waged at the time of his accession, these were significant achievements for Qaboos. Allowing for the difficulties of accurately assessing public opinion in an absolutist monarchy, it seems as though he was regarded with genuine reverence by most of his subjects.2 Yet, although the autocratic system Qaboos developed proved durable during his rule, Peterson argues that his successor Haitham bin Tariq may well face challenges to state stability arising from excessive dependence on oil production, stagnating living standards, and the difficulties of introducing reforms in the face of vested elite interests (534–39). Furthermore, as the author notes:Peterson refers to Hanna Batatu’s seminal study of Iraq as the inspiration for Oman’s Transformation, and in terms of its size and scope it represents an exhaustive study of Oman’s development since the 1970s and the key personalities who have shaped it.3 This includes covering aspects of the Sultanate’s history that its monarchical regime would prefer not to discuss, notably the British-backed 1970 coup that overthrew Said and installed Qaboos (76–87) and the corruption and graft associated with the “Muscat Mafia” of Omani and foreign cronies of the former Sultan (157–71). Oman’s Transformation also provides a thorough account of the evolution of the Omani military from the largely British-led Sultan’s Armed Forces (408–25) and the adaptation of its foreign policy in the context of crises such as the three Gulf Wars, Iran’s confrontation with the West, and the series of civil wars in neighbouring Yemen (445–506).This is a very comprehensive study of Oman since 1970; perhaps in some respects it is too comprehensive. Peterson’s knowledge and understanding of the Sultanate’s internal development and external policies is truly authoritative, but the reviewer wonders if it would have been better for him to write three separate books instead (perhaps on politics, the economy, and foreign affairs/defense/security). The balance a scholar strikes between the detail and the tour d’horizon is a difficult one to reach, but the reviewer’s conclusion was that Oman’s Transformation compromised on readability by going into too much detail in each of its subject areas. Furthermore, while the readers of any scholarly work should be expected to have a strong attention span, it is something of a burden on their patience and endurance to submit them to chapters that are over 100 pages long (notably with Chapter 3 on politics).The length and density of Oman’s Transformation make it a less-than-accessible source for a general readership, but its authoritativeness and depth of research make it a valuable reference text for academics or graduate-level students. It also represents a fitting testimony to the author’s contribution to the study of Oman and the debt that scholars in his field owe to him.