Constitutional Amendment Proposals as Position-Taking Activity in the U.S. House of Representatives (1979–2020)

It is almost impossible to change the United States Constitution, yet members of Congress (MCs) continue to introduce resolutions to do so. Why do they do this? I argue that the sponsorship of constitutional amendments in modern congressional politics is a unique form of low-cost position-taking. Examining the House of Representatives across four decades of constitutional stagnation, I analyze which members engage in amendment sponsorship, and when they do so. First, I find that more ideologically marginalized members are more likely to sponsor amendments. Second, I show that MCs sponsor amendments when they are more electorally vulnerable and institutionally weak. I also find that the role of ideology is asymmetric and time-variant. Among MCs who entered Congress prior to 1997, more conservative Democrats were more likely to become amendment sponsors. Today, sponsorship is more closely related to ideological extremity among both Democrats and Republicans.