Reaffirming the moral and legal significance of birth: a critical response to Giubilini and Minerva

This article offers a sustained philosophical and legal critique of Giubilini and Minerva's controversial thesis in 'After-Birth Abortion: Why Should the Baby Live?' The authors argue that newborns, like foetuses, lack full moral status and that infanticide may be ethically permissible in circumstances analogous to abortion. This response challenges that view on three grounds: (1) conceptually, the claim that birth is morally irrelevant is inconsistent with established theories of moral worth rooted in potentiality and the value of a future-like-ours; (2) legally, neonates acquire personhood at birth in both domestic and international legal systems, making their killing unlawful; and (3) ethically, societal practices and intuitions clearly ascribe value and rights to newborns, regardless of developmental stage. The article concludes that the thesis of after-birth abortion is ethically indefensible and legally untenable.