Moral Progress – Criteria and Examples

The first part of the article (sections 2-6) sketches a general, criterial theory of moral progress. Three types of moral progress are distinguished: 1. ethical progress, i.e. the epistemic and moral improvement of moral theory (ethics), 2. practical-moral progress or moral progress in the narrow sense, i.e. the moral improvement of moral systems and moral action, and 3. mundane moral progress, i.e. the mundane improvement of the world according to moral criteria of social well-being. These concepts are defined and the definitions are justified without circularity. Characteristics of this approach are, for one thing, the inclusion of ethical progress, which is what first brings about the central concept of moral desirability and which can then be used in the definition of moral progress in the narrow sense, and for another thing, that ethical progress, and thus also the justification of the definition of the concept of moral desirability is not moral but epistemic and is based on prudential desirability. Furthermore, epistemic problems of these definitions and criteria are discussed, such as their circle-free justification and self-referentiality (sect. 6). The second part (sect. 7-10) lists examples of the three types of progress, but also corresponding regressions. The appendix (sect. 11) discusses some alternative theories of moral progress.