Appointing the auditor-general: political control and audit transparency in Ghana

Purpose This study examines how political influence over the appointment of the Auditor-General (AG) in Ghana can undermine audit transparency, institutional independence and public trust in fiscal accountability. It investigates how executive control undermines the objectivity and effectiveness of the Ghana Audit Service (GAS) and proposes actionable reform strategies to reinforce audit integrity in emerging democracies. Design/methodology/approach Using principal-agent theory, this research investigates how executive control distorts the accountability relationship between public auditors and citizens, revealing how formal legal provisions can be undermined by informal political practices. This qualitative case study involves 52 semi-structured interviews with key actors in Ghana's public financial management (PFM) system; these are analyzed thematically to identify critical patterns. Findings Executive discretion heavily influences AG appointments, reducing audit objectivity and weakening public trust in the GAS. Moreover, structural weaknesses, including opaque appointment procedures, budgetary dependence and selective audit reporting, compromise the watchdog function of the Supreme Audit Institution (SAI). Research limitations/implications This study focuses on Ghana. While the findings may not be generalizable, they may apply to emerging democracies facing similar challenges. Further comparative research is encouraged to test the reform framework applied here. Practical implications Ghana's case revealed a pattern where executive dominance over appointments undermines public accountability. Strengthening legislative oversight, maintaining audit budgets and institutionalizing transparent performance review mechanisms are critical. Originality/value This study provides empirical evidence on AG appointments in Ghana, by integrating temporal analysis into public sector auditing. These insights contribute to both academic understanding and accountability frameworks where informal political pressures test formal independence.