Pure theory of globalization and deglobalization

• There are three globalizations: neoliberal, progressive and Trump populist • Neoliberal, progressive and Trump populist globalizations are all coercive • Bergson welfare theory precisely identifies their characteristics • Neoliberal, progressive and Trump populist globalizations are likely to coexist • The merit of neoliberal, progressive and Trump populist globalizations depends on efficiency and values Globalization is the plausible, but controvertible surmise that increased connectivity, migration, trade, technology transfer and diffusion are creating a homogeneous, modernizing and increasingly prosperous world (James and Steger, 2014). 1 1 Globalization came into popular use in the 1990s to describe the unprecedented international connectivity of the post–Cold War world. It was an abstraction independent of ideology and system (capitalism, socialism, or communism). Globalization until recently took two opposing market forms: 2 2 Modernization is a key aspect of globalization and is widespread occurring across economic systems. neoliberal ( Gerstle, 2022 ), 3 3 Globalization, from a neoliberal perspective, is driven by free market principles, advocating for minimal government intervention and the free flow of capital, goods, and services across borders. This perspective views globalization as a positive force, leading to increased wealth, technological advancement, and global interconnectedness. and progressive ( Manak, Kopans and Johnson, 2025 ). 4 4 Globalization, understood as the increasing interconnectedness and interdependence of countries, can be viewed as a progressive concept when approached with a focus on social justice and anti-meritocratic equitable outcomes. A "progressive globalization" framework emphasizes shared prosperity, poverty reduction, and “progressive” democratic governance on a global scale, rather than solely focusing on economic growth. Both concepts combine elements of non-cooperative and cooperative game theory. 5 5 Progressives are staunch advocates of transnational institutions like the European Union and The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Donald Trump has added another version, emphasizing populist economic and security competition tailored to his working-class constituency’s needs. The concept is a non-cooperative game sceptical of cooperative world governance ( Nash, 1951 ), 6 6 In game theory, non-cooperative games are those where players act independently, without forming binding agreements or coalitions to achieve a common goal. Instead, players focus on maximizing their own individual payoff or outcome, based on their own strategies and the perceived strategies of others. and relies heavily on coercion ( Mearsheimer, 2001 ). 7 7 Trump’s approach is akin to John Mearsheimer’s concept of offensive realism. It places prioritizes economic and security competition among great powers within the anarchy of the international system. Trump wants to convert nations to populism purged of progressive social justice mandates and transfers. Contemporary neoliberals, progressives and populists want everyone to embrace their values. All three approaches are workably competitive ( Clark, 1940 ). They are likely to coexist unless one vanquishes at least one of the other two. The political battles between contemporary progressives and Trump populists, sundry armed conflicts and virulent tariff wars threaten globalization’s promised prosperity and amity but there has been no rigorous assessment of the danger. This essay uses Pareto welfare theory pioneered by Abram Bergson in 1938 to parse potential welfare costs of progressive and Trump populist globalizations.