Unequal Solidarity: Club Rules and Crisis Support in the European Polity

Abstract Is European solidarity during crises due to common or close identities? Or do Europeans punish rule‐breaking countries by showing them less solidarity? Research on the determinants of European solidarity increasingly focuses on ‘solidarity to’, how givers' attitudes are shaped by their perceptions of receiving member states. Amongst many, there are two possible channels of solidarity in the EU: either through a common identity or through the perception of deservingness and playing by common rules. We know little about how closely EU citizens' attitudes correlate with the observed behaviours of other countries. This matters because in compound, multinational polities like the EU, preferences for emergency solidarity are rooted in perceptions of shared political community, not thicker identities like in national welfare states. We find that undermining certain common EU rules reduces solidarity, but not all rules and states are equal. European solidarity is thus influenced by an interaction between country identity and rule‐breaking: new member states from Central Europe are more punished for breaking the rules, whilst founding member states get a free pass. In line with other findings in the experimental literature, the risk is that the European polity is built on fixed identity‐differentiated solidarity, rather than liberal egalitarian ideals.