Reframing the Hard Problem of Consciousness

This preprint proposes a structural resolution to the Hard Problem of Consciousness (HPC) by identifying a category error at its core. Rather than attempting to derive subjective experience from physical processes, the framework clarifies the distinct roles of ontology, structure, and representation. The paper introduces the C-constant, representing ontological consciousness as an invariant condition of illumination, and the I–S–R model, which distinguishes illumination (I), structural mediation (S), and representational experience (R). Within this framework, neuroscience is reinterpreted as explaining how experiences are shaped, without claiming to generate consciousness itself. By dissolving the assumption that matter produces consciousness, the explanatory gap underlying the HPC is shown to arise from conceptual misclassification rather than empirical insufficiency. The framework preserves the explanatory power of physics and neuroscience while avoiding reductionism, idealism, and metaphysical inflation. A non-doctrinal comparison with Vedantic epistemology is included as an epistemic analogy, not a theological claim. This work is intended as a conceptual clarification within philosophy of mind and philosophy of science rather than an empirical hypothesis.