Service strategy of a sharing platform in a supply chain under information asymmetry

Abstract Sharing platforms can operate in a B2C (business‐to‐customer) mode, a C2C (customer‐to‐customer) mode, or a hybrid. The choice of sharing mode not only influences downstream customers but also has consequences for upstream product manufacturers. Additionally, the sharing platform's ability to gather user and provider data creates information advantages over manufacturers. Motivated by this, we consider a supply chain where a manufacturer can sell products to a sharing platform, where the latter holds private information about the proportion of renters. A type‐dependent screening model is developed to study the sharing platform's service strategy and the manufacturer's contract design. Our findings indicate that, under information symmetry, when the cannibalization effect from B2C intensifies (i.e., the renter proportion and service fee are high), expanding the customer base or raising the service fee can harm the sharing platform. However, when this effect is weak, adopting a hybrid mode allows the sharing platform to benefit from broader market coverage and a higher fee. Under information asymmetry, the sharing platform is classified as either H ‐type or L ‐type based on its private information. When the level of information uncertainty is high, the manufacturer may shut down the inefficient L ‐type sharing platform. Alternatively, if the manufacturer does not shut down the L ‐type sharing platform, when the service fee is low, both types adopt the hybrid mode, and the manufacturer suffers as the sharing platform receives more commission income from the C2C mode. Interestingly, the sharing platform's profit may be non‐monotonic in the level of information uncertainty.