Bureaucrat performance evaluation and national development: Evidence from mayors in China

Building a moderately prosperous society in all respects (MPSR) is China's fundamental development goal for the first two decades of twenty-first century. This study explores the role of the bureaucrat performance evaluation (BPE) system in the country's development during this period. Using the turnover data of prefecture-level mayors from 2003 to 2018, the study finds that the BPE system was multi-task based, under which the likelihood of promotion of mayors would be increased when they exhibited positive performance in the fields covered by the MPSR goals. Furthermore, the incentive effects of the multi-task-based BPE system on the performance of mayors were heterogeneous across regions and times, which reinforced the motivation of mayors in improving their performance in any case. The study adds empirical evidence to a growing literature that emphasizes the impact of the bureaucrat performance evaluation on the national development.