On Professional Child Athletes: Why Serving for Money in Tennis is Morally Comparable to Serving for Money at McDonald’s

This chapter defends the view that it is morally permissible for a child to be a professional athlete if and only if three conditions are met: (a) the child is at or above the minimum age determined by the best theory of when children may undertake paid employment; (b) the child is at or above the age determined by the best theory of when children may compete in the relevant sport on an amateur basis; and (c) the child signs a sports employment contract that complies with the occupational safety and health standards applicable to non-sports employment. This view arguably avoids the ad hoc adjustments that plague the “folk theory” of professional youth sport, which allows children to engage in elite amateur competition, as well as other forms of paid work, but not to earn money through professional sport. Contrary to common assumptions, introducing money into elite youth sport may help address the unhealthy pressures sometimes found in such environments. If it is morally permissible for a child to compete in a sporting activity without pay, then there is a regulatory framework under which it is morally permissible for the child to compete in the same sporting activity for pay. The moral issue lies in the activity itself, not in the presence or absence of payment.