Veilige schema’s om software te maskeren tegen aanvallen gebaseerd op vermogenanalyse

Cryptographic algorithms, though mathematically secure, may leak information when implemented on physical devices. Side-channel analysis exploits such leakages, for example power consumption, to recover secret data. Masking aims to decorrelate power consumption from internal computations but often fails in practice due to hardware effects that violate its security assumptions. Software masking, suffers from a gap between theoretical and practical security caused by micro-architectural leakages. Since many microcontrollers have undocumented internal behavior, these leakages vary across platforms, challenging both security and portability. While algebraically complex masking schemes can improve resistance, they often introduce significant overhead and still leave room for improvement. This project introduces new properties that enable first-order secure and portable masking across different microcontrollers. It also explores algebraically more complex schemes, such as inner product and code-based masking, that offer stronger resistance to transition leakages and achieve higher security orders with fewer shares. Finally, it proposes a mathematical framework to evaluate the algebraic compatibility between masking schemes and leakage functions, allowing quantitative and qualitative comparison of their security.