We Can Believe Quasi-Realism

According to one influential line of thought, quasi-realism is faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, if the quasi-realist project of saying everything the realist wants to say is successful, quasi-realism collapses into realism. On the other hand, if the quasi-realist stops short of saying everything the realist wants to say, quasi-realism fails to realize its explanatory ambitions. In a recent paper, Bart Streumer argues that there is a way for the quasi-realist to avoid this problem by endorsing the first horn of the dilemma. More specifically, Streumer argues that quasi-realism could be true although we are unable to believe it, and that our inability to believe could be evidence for its truth. In this paper, we first argue that Streumer’s argument is unsuccessful. We then argue that Streumer’s argument is unsuccessful for an interesting reason; namely for how it invites the exploration of an underappreciated theoretical alternative along broadly pragmatist lines, which we outline in the final section of the paper. What hinges on this invitation is nothing less than the question of what contemporary debates in metaethics and metanormativity are all about.