Rule in the new European Union

This article suggests that the economically activist tendencies of the European Union are not just a temporary response to exogenous crises, but part of a long-term transformation of the EU into a governance structure that is increasingly equipped for forms of more direct rule over its territory, economy, and citizens, albeit still in an incomplete and contested manner. This transformation hinges on three interlocking processes that feed into each other and accelerate: (i) the rise of EU-level material, financial, and institutional infrastructure; (ii) the significant centralisation of EU power; and (iii) novel narrations about the ‘point’ of the EU that stabilise its authority. This transformation of the EU brings with it new challenges for its authority. Using the work by Charles Tilly, who focuses on the way in which trust networks are integrated in rule, this article distinguishes between the EU’s ability to rule by way of coercion, by way of capital and by way of commitment. It is suggested that while the EU’s ability to rule by way of coercion and capital have grown, it remains difficult to envisage how the EU may stably reproduce commitments structures that would allow it to transition into a stable and democratic structure of governance.