On the Moral Duties of Voters

Voting is morally significant insofar as it is an act by which citizens indirectly exercise power over others by taking part in the causal chain that ends up shaping the laws of a country (under minimal democratic conditions). Considering this, I argue that the most fundamental duty of voters is a duty of decentration, i.e., a duty to look beyond the impact of their single vote and to acknowledge their responsibility for others when deciding whether and how to vote. From this fundamental duty, at least three more concrete duties can be derived. 1) A duty to give primary attention to non-personal considerations like justice and well-being. 2) A duty to acquire sufficient and balanced information, and to fairly engage with opposing views. 3) A duty to vote (tactically) when we have sufficient reasons to believe that we can contribute to alleviating injustice or suffering. Although these duties are demanding, they do not entail that many people should abstain, and even less that universal suffrage should be questioned. In many cases, voters will have weightier reasons to vote than to abstain. Recognizing these duties should invite us to consider institutional ways of facilitating voters’ fulfilment of their duties.