Worldviews and enactivism in hinge epistemology

This master’s thesis focuses on engaging deeply with contemporary hinge epistemology. There is a serious gap in the philosophical literature concerning the concept of a worldview, even though many theorists in this field rely on something like it to make their theories whole. In chapter one, I attempt to fill this gap by offering a full analysis of the concept. This analysis culminates in an exhaustive list of the essential features and functions of a worldview. Included in this list is the relationship that holds between hinges and the rest of the features described in a worldview. Chapter one concludes by showing what effect this would have on hinge epistemologists’ theories if they were to take my arguments seriously. In chapter two, I offer a separate theory for hinge epistemology that relies heavily on Enactivism. By introducing this understanding to hinge epistemology, I show how it solves certain problems in accepted hinge theories but also maintains the functions those in the field want hinges to play.