Lessons from Pragmatism for Philosophers of Science: Nine Teachings and a Cautionary Tale

I defend nine elements of pragma c philosophy and show how they apply to scientific inquiry. Pragmatism provides a focus on inquiry that adopts fallibilism, denies all foundations, and looks for practical or concrete effects of our theories and actions. Pragmatists hold that universal and fixed principles are not necessary for objective knowledge, maintaining an everyday realism while rejecting metaphysical realism and the dualism that it entails. In the empirical sciences we must interact with things in the world to see whether or not our theories are correct, therefore recovering a pragmatic notion of experience from James and Dewey is central to understanding physical science. Pragmatists also deny the existence of simple dichotomies, arguing instead that opposing concepts lie along a continuum. Notably, facts and values are both objects of unified inquiry. Finally, I consider the pragmatists’ various theories of truth and argue that it would be be er to avoid defining truth by adopting a deflationary account. Rather than taking the definition of truth to be central to pragmatism, I argue that should be left aside given that classical pragmatists disagree about it. Classical pragmatists could then be said to agree on a basic set of principles while leaving truth undefined. Philosophers of science should follow the common core of principles that define pragmatic philosophy as they try to understand scientific practice; indeed, these teachings of pragmatism have already been accepted widely by philosophers of science.