Can we do without absolute goodness?

Recent work by Richard Kraut and Nandi Theunissen calls into question the existence of goodness as a property. In its place, they argue for goodness as a relation, claiming that all goodness claims are reducible to (or, explicable by) goodness-for claims. In place of absolute goodness, they pose non-instrumental good-fors as the foundation of goodness. In this paper, I argue that their structure of value has serious problems in treating the goodness-for relation as the foundation of goodness. I maintain that their arguments either lead to vicious circular reasoning, or a disguised notion of absolute goodness. Further, I return to G.E. Moore, a proponent of absolute goodness, in order to see if his structure of goodness can withstand the objections levied against him by the good-for theorists. G.E. Moore is capable of responding to their objections as well as having a metaphysically stronger and more flexible account of goodness.