Peer disagreement, permissivism, and deference

How should an agent respond to peer disagreement? Two options have been defended in the literature: either remaining steadfast, where an agent maintains her credence, or conciliating, where an agent moves her credence closer to her peer’s. In this thesis, I defend a third option: deference. In chapter II, I argue that, in some cases, it is permissible for an agent to respond to peer disagreement about whether p by adopting the peer’s credence with respect to p. My argument draws on Kelly’s insight regarding permissivism, the claim that two agents are rationally permitted to have different responses to the same body of evidence. Kelly argues that accepting permissivism allows one to reject conciliationism. Kelly is right about that, but rejecting conciliationism does not lead directly to steadfastness. Permissivism also makes room for deference. Agents can reasonably differ on the extent to which they prioritize their own epistemic agency over others’ epistemic agency. Agents who value the epistemic agency of others more strongly are rationally permitted to defer to their peers in some cases of peer disagreement. In chapter III, I consider two strong objections to my account. The first is that agents should bracket their first-order evidence upon encountering the higher-order evidence that one’s peer disagrees. I respond by relying on an argument from Chen and Worsnip that peer disagreement has a role both as higher-order evidence and testimonial evidence. Building on this, I argue that it can be rational for an agent to place higher value in the testimonial evidence than she places in the higher-order evidence. Thus, it can be rational for an agent to defer as a response to peer disagreement. The second objection is that an agent should strike a balance between being a conformist and a nonconformist. I respond that an agent being more conformist can help her to achieve epistemic goods and that we should consider that some agents have the starting position of being more conformist.

Publication Details

Journal
SHAREOK (University of Oklahoma; Oklahoma State University; Central Oklahoma University)
Published
2025-05-01
Primary Topic
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
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article
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article

Peer disagreement, permissivism, and deference

SHAREOK (University of Oklahoma; Oklahoma State University; Central Oklahoma University)
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
article

Peer disagreement, permissivism, and deference

article en

Abstract

How should an agent respond to peer disagreement? Two options have been defended in the literature: either remaining steadfast, where an agent maintains her credence, or conciliating, where an agent moves her credence closer to her peer’s. In this thesis, I defend a third option: deference. In chapter II, I argue that, in some cases, it is permissible for an agent to respond to peer disagreement about whether p by adopting the peer’s credence with respect to p. My argument draws on Kelly’s insight regarding permissivism, the claim that two agents are rationally permitted to have different responses to the same body of evidence. Kelly argues that accepting permissivism allows one to reject conciliationism. Kelly is right about that, but rejecting conciliationism does not lead directly to steadfastness. Permissivism also makes room for deference. Agents can reasonably differ on the extent to which they prioritize their own epistemic agency over others’ epistemic agency. Agents who value the epistemic agency of others more strongly are rationally permitted to defer to their peers in some cases of peer disagreement. In chapter III, I consider two strong objections to my account. The first is that agents should bracket their first-order evidence upon encountering the higher-order evidence that one’s peer disagrees. I respond by relying on an argument from Chen and Worsnip that peer disagreement has a role both as higher-order evidence and testimonial evidence. Building on this, I argue that it can be rational for an agent to place higher value in the testimonial evidence than she places in the higher-order evidence. Thus, it can be rational for an agent to defer as a response to peer disagreement. The second objection is that an agent should strike a balance between being a conformist and a nonconformist. I respond that an agent being more conformist can help her to achieve epistemic goods and that we should consider that some agents have the starting position of being more conformist.

SHAREOK (University of Oklahoma; Oklahoma State University; Central Oklahoma University)
Reduced inequalities
Openalex Percentile: Top 28%
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
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