Inquiry into language acquisition, nativism, and logical impossibility

This thesis explores the longstanding philosophical discussion concerning language acquisition and whether it is an innate human capacity. The inquiry focuses on the tension between Nativist and Empiricist perspectives. After defining key terms, like the distinction between domain-general and domain-specific cognitive functions, the paper outlines the typical Nativist argumentative structure, which often labels Empiricist explanations as logically impossible. The analysis focuses on Noam Chomsky’s “Poverty of the Stimulus” argument, a representative case of such argumentation. I argue that this approach overreaches, concluding logical impossibility where, at best, the evidence only proves empirical improbability. Further, I present Large Language Models as a crucial counterexample, as they acquire language through purely empirical means; the fact that LLMs acquire language solely by induction undermines the Nativist claims of logical impossibility. I conclude by recommending a shift in philosophical discourse away from arguments for logical impossibility, and toward inferences to the best explanation, as I establish how such a shift promises a more productive discussion.