Are Your LLM-based Text-to-SQL Models Secure? Exploring SQL Injection via Backdoor Attacks

Large language models (LLMs) have shown state-of-the-art results in translating natural language questions into SQL queries (Text-to-SQL), a long-standing challenge within the database community. However, security concerns remain largely unexplored, particularly the threat of backdoor attacks, which can introduce malicious behaviors into models through fine-tuning with poisoned datasets. In this work, we systematically investigate the vulnerabilities of LLM-based Text-to-SQL models and present ToxicSQL, a novel backdoor attack framework. Our approach leverages stealthy command-like and character-level triggers to make backdoors difficult to detect and remove, ensuring that malicious behaviors remain covert while maintaining high model accuracy on benign inputs. Furthermore, we propose leveraging SQL injection payloads as backdoor targets, enabling the generation of malicious yet executable SQL queries, which pose severe security and privacy risks in language model-based SQL development. We demonstrate that injecting only 0.44% of poisoned data can result in an attack success rate of 79.41%, posing a significant risk to database security. Additionally, we propose detection and mitigation strategies to enhance model reliability. Our findings highlight the urgent need for security-aware Text-to-SQL development, emphasizing the importance of robust defenses against backdoor threats.

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Publication Details

Journal
Proceedings of the ACM on Management of Data
Published
2025-12-04
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1145/3769762
Citations
3
Primary Topic
Web Application Security Vulnerabilities
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
9.74
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article

Are Your LLM-based Text-to-SQL Models Secure? Exploring SQL Injection via Backdoor Attacks

3 citations
Proceedings of the ACM on Management of Data
Web Application Security Vulnerabilities
9.74
article

Are Your LLM-based Text-to-SQL Models Secure? Exploring SQL Injection via Backdoor Attacks

article en
3 citations

Abstract

Large language models (LLMs) have shown state-of-the-art results in translating natural language questions into SQL queries (Text-to-SQL), a long-standing challenge within the database community. However, security concerns remain largely unexplored, particularly the threat of backdoor attacks, which can introduce malicious behaviors into models through fine-tuning with poisoned datasets. In this work, we systematically investigate the vulnerabilities of LLM-based Text-to-SQL models and present ToxicSQL, a novel backdoor attack framework. Our approach leverages stealthy command-like and character-level triggers to make backdoors difficult to detect and remove, ensuring that malicious behaviors remain covert while maintaining high model accuracy on benign inputs. Furthermore, we propose leveraging SQL injection payloads as backdoor targets, enabling the generation of malicious yet executable SQL queries, which pose severe security and privacy risks in language model-based SQL development. We demonstrate that injecting only 0.44% of poisoned data can result in an attack success rate of 79.41%, posing a significant risk to database security. Additionally, we propose detection and mitigation strategies to enhance model reliability. Our findings highlight the urgent need for security-aware Text-to-SQL development, emphasizing the importance of robust defenses against backdoor threats.

Proceedings of the ACM on Management of DataVol. 3(6)
Emory University (US), Cornell University (US), Sichuan University (CN), Institute of Science Tokyo (JP)
Peace, Justice and strong institutions
Openalex Percentile: Top 2%
Web Application Security Vulnerabilities
9.74
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