Two ways of arguing with culture

Abstract Arguing with culture—that is, making claims with and about culture—seems to require one to assert something about what culture does. But I propose that such a requirement unduly limits sociologists to an invariant, positivist form of argument. By examining claims making with and about culture in terms of mereology, or part-whole relations, I distinguish two modes of arguing with culture: fragmentary and constitutive. The former revolves around claims wherein parts are potentially autonomous bearers of distinct forces ; the latter revolves around claims wherein parts mediate one another, and their relations evince distinct forms . Moreover, these two modes of argument entail different ways of appealing to wholes. Fragmentary arguments treat wholes as analytically insignificant residuals. Constitutive arguments treat wholes as analytically crucial. Thus, attention to how people argue with culture opens the space for careful reflection on and debate about explanatory practices.