Kuhn on Values: Resolving the Puzzles Concerning Science

Abstract Laudan identifies two fundamental puzzles concerning science, revealing its Janus-faced nature: the puzzle of agreement and the puzzle of disagreement. For him, existing accounts of scientific change fail to resolve both puzzles. He particularly challenges Kuhn’s account in order to advance his reticulated model of scientific rationality. In this regard, this paper pursues two related aims: First, it argues that Laudan’s model falls short in adequately accounting for both dimensions of science as he himself defines them, and generates new problems absent in Kuhn. Second, it establishes overlooked continuities between the earlier and later Kuhn, arguing that Laudan’s critique applies only to these two stages and not to a transitional phase. In this transitional phase, Kuhnian values uniquely address both of Laudan’s puzzles by integrating both shared values and subjective considerations. Thus, I argue that only Kuhn’s Janus-faced conception of values truly explains the dual character of science.