Family firms and tax avoidance preferences: Evidence from India

Recent research on the tax avoidance preferences of family firms has yielded mixed results. We address this by examining tax avoidance behaviour in the Indian market, a unique setting characterised by concentrated family ownership and comparatively weak investor protections. Our findings show that family firms engage in less tax avoidance than non-family firms, particularly when descendant family members serve as chairpersons or CEOs. We further identify a U-shaped association between family ownership and tax avoidance: moderate family ownership reduces avoidance through alignment effects, whereas very high ownership fosters entrenchment and greater avoidance. Subsample analyses reveal that the negative association between family ownership and tax avoidance holds only under low competition and limited market growth. In highly competitive and high-growth environments, external pressures outweigh family-specific concerns. Overall, our findings enrich the understanding of family firms' tax behaviour in emerging markets and offer important implications for governance, investor protection, and tax policy. • Family firms in India exhibit a lower tax avoidance behaviour than non-family firms. • This association is prominent when the CEO or Chairman is a descendant family member. • Low competition or growth strengthens the negative family–avoidance link. • Family firms avoid higher taxes when their ownership reaches a threshold limit. • Tax avoidance raises value for high-ownership firms but lowers it for low-ownership firms.