Leibniz on Justice for Future Generations

Abstract Leibniz’s definition of justice as the charity of the wise suggests obligations to future generations, but Leibniz seldom discusses intergenerational ethics directly. This paper examines what Leibniz’s theory of justice entails for intergenerational ethics by addressing both why we have obligations to the future and what those obligations require. Drawing on Leibniz’s Dialogue entre Theophile et Polidore (1679) and related writings, I reconstruct two arguments Leibniz uses to ground obligations to the common good and to posterity: (1) “the temporal horizon argument” focused on divine recompense and (2) “the perpetual citizenship argument” focused on the commonwealth of minds. I argue that while the first argument implicitly includes care for posterity, the second makes such obligations clearer and more compelling by establishing a transgenerational moral community. The paper concludes by outlining a Leibnizian framework for intergenerational justice, showing how Leibniz balances his commitment to the present with his commitment to progress.