Irregularity Theory: A Deductive Approach to Existence

Abstract Modern science—and most theories of laws—are built around regularity (i.e., patterns that repeat or persist). Yet much of what we meet looks irregular. Irregularity Theory (IT) starts there. It asks what irregularity is, and what must be true of a world in which irregularities can appear at all. The answer is strict: even irregularity presupposes persisting order—a minimal structure that endures across neighbouring instants so that we can re-identify items through change and make sense of interactions across moments. From this, a conditional follows wherever anything exists in our universe (or, more generally, in any domain), some persisting order must obtain. In that sense Absolute Irregularity—the total absence of any persisting order—is incompatible with existence. The result is not a theory of law; it is a pre-nomic constraint that any account of laws must respect. It clarifies how widespread irregular appearances can coexist with minimal order, and it sets the groundwork for further papers on Descartes’ cogito, reducing Foundationalism to physics, explaining why anything exists, and comparisons across law-theories (Humean Best-System: Lewis 1986; anti-Humean constraint/governing views: Maudlin 2007; for irregularity context: Miller 2014a). Author accepted manuscript / preprint; please cite the published version when available.