A paradox of modal knowledge

Abstract Is it possible to consistently suppose, for at least some choice of , that: (i) it might be that , (ii) it might be that , and (iii) someone knows whether ? Of course. I argue that this obvious fact is incompatible with the factivity of knowledge as traditionally understood.

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Publication Details

Journal
Analysis
Published
2024-09-30
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anae091
Primary Topic
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

A paradox of modal knowledge

Analysis
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
article

A paradox of modal knowledge

article en

Abstract

Abstract Is it possible to consistently suppose, for at least some choice of , that: (i) it might be that , (ii) it might be that , and (iii) someone knows whether ? Of course. I argue that this obvious fact is incompatible with the factivity of knowledge as traditionally understood.

Analysis
University of California, Berkeley (US)
Reduced inequalities
Openalex Percentile: Top 15%
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
DOISourceOpenAlex
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A paradox of modal knowledge · Analysis (2024) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS