<i>Accessory after the fact</i> : A moral vindication of the legal category

Abstract Can an act of yours, unpremeditated and not begun until after my wrongful action, make you morally complicit in my deed? The ancient common law says it can. Modern commentators demur, holding an accessory after the fact to be an accessory in name only. I argue that the common law has right on its side. Often what one has done, and what wrong one is responsible for having committed, are determined, in part, by factors not within one’s control. But those factors are not necessarily within no one’s control. When, intentionally but without prior co-ordination, you act in such a way as to make the wrong I have performed more wrongful, more harmful, or a wrong which stands unannulled for longer, you make yourself my accomplice, by changing – worsening – what I have done. I argue that moral philosophy should recognize the accomplice liability of accessories after the fact.