The Bright Side of Labor Unions: Evidence From Working Capital Management

Abstract This study documents that unionization imposes a heterogeneous impact on working capital policies. We argue and demonstrate that the impact of unionization on working capital depends on financial performance. Specifically, the rent extraction effect incentivizes profitable firms to reduce working capital to gain bargaining advantages, whereas the operating risk effect motivates less profitable firms to increase working capital to hedge against risk. To establish causality, we employ instrumental variables based on the proportions of female and part‐time workers, as well as a regression discontinuity design (RDD) based on union election outcomes. A difference‐in‐differences (DID) analysis exploiting the staggered adoption of right‐to‐work laws further confirms that unions influence firm behavior through their bargaining power. Additional mechanism analyzes validate the existence of both the rent extraction and operating risk effects. Moreover, we find that the impact of unionization on working capital is independent of firms’ cash policies, suggesting that cash and working capital are not perfect substitutes. Finally, we provide evidence that shareholders perceive unions’ influence on working capital as value‐enhancing. Overall, the findings illuminate a bright side of union power and offer new insights into how labor relations shape corporate liquidity management.