Kantian subjects : an analysis of the fundamental logical structure of the categorical imperative and the equivalence of its formulations

This thesis offers a detailed and critical interpretation of Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative and its multiple formulations. Its aim is to highlight some of the problems that arise from treating the formulations as being extensionally equivalent with each other. At the same time, it also looks to provide an original interpretation in which some formulations refer to different subjects, namely, they operate at a different level of abstraction with regard to rational agency. While they are all expressions of the same principle, not all are extensionally equivalent because they consider the ontology of the rational agent from different standpoints. The work first explains how the categorical imperative lies as the ultimate condition of possibility of the summum bonum in Kant’s moral theory. It then presents the significant lack of consensus among scholars regarding how the categorical imperative and its formulations operate and relate to one another. This work then analyses Hegel’s critique of the categorical imperative to show the difficulties of having the Fundamental Law of Pure Practical Reason in the Critique of Practical Reason be equivalent to those in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, especially the formulation that is known as the Formula of Universal Law. Finally, this work proposes that the different formulations pertain to distinct levels of abstraction or subjects, which is evidenced among other things by the different behavior of the formulations due to the differences of their conceptual structures, which reflect the underlying differences in the analysis of the ontology of rational agency.