Authoritarian Commitments to Democratic Ideals: The Role of Constitutional Preambles in Central Asia

Constitutional preambles serve as introductory statements outlining a constitution’s purpose, justification and foundations. While preambles in democratic states often affirm commitments to human rights, democracy and the rule of law, those in authoritarian regimes frequently appropriate democratic language to legitimise autocratic rule, yet they remain largely understudied. This article examines the function of constitutional preambles in authoritarian regimes, with a particular focus on Central Asia, encompassing five former Soviet republics: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, these states adopted formally democratic constitutions despite remaining consolidated autocracies. Their preambles frequently invoke democratic values and human rights, raising questions about their purpose. By analysing these preambles, this article explores how they function as instruments of authoritarian governance. It assesses both symbolic and practical significance and situates them within broader debates on constitutions in autocracies to illuminate how authoritarian states manipulate constitutional language to reinforce their rule while borrowing democratic rhetoric to maintain credibility.