The Alliance Dilemma and the Onset of War. A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Abstract This article seeks to explain the outbreak of war between Ukraine and Russia in February 2022. The cause of the conflict appears to be very simple: Vladimir Putin wanted to go to war with Kyiv. However, as the bargaining model of war states: a conflict takes at least two actors, both of whom are determined to stop negotiating and resort to arms. We argue here that the negative spiral which led to the outbreak of war can be explained as the outcome of three interrelated strategic games that produced a failure in the US/NATO deterrence posture towards Moscow, an unclear (emboldening?) message sent by the US/NATO to Ukraine, and a misunderstanding of Russia’s war aims (limited vs. unlimited) in Ukraine. A formal model is proposed that explains the outcome of the crisis as the equilibria produced by the interaction of the three actors’ decisions.

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Publication Details

Journal
Peace Economics Peace Science and Public Policy
Published
2025-11-11
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2025-0039
Primary Topic
European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

The Alliance Dilemma and the Onset of War. A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Peace Economics Peace Science and Public Policy
European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies
article

The Alliance Dilemma and the Onset of War. A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

article en

Abstract

Abstract This article seeks to explain the outbreak of war between Ukraine and Russia in February 2022. The cause of the conflict appears to be very simple: Vladimir Putin wanted to go to war with Kyiv. However, as the bargaining model of war states: a conflict takes at least two actors, both of whom are determined to stop negotiating and resort to arms. We argue here that the negative spiral which led to the outbreak of war can be explained as the outcome of three interrelated strategic games that produced a failure in the US/NATO deterrence posture towards Moscow, an unclear (emboldening?) message sent by the US/NATO to Ukraine, and a misunderstanding of Russia’s war aims (limited vs. unlimited) in Ukraine. A formal model is proposed that explains the outcome of the crisis as the equilibria produced by the interaction of the three actors’ decisions.

Peace Economics Peace Science and Public PolicyVol. 31(4)
University of Trento (IT)
Peace, Justice and strong institutions
Openalex Percentile: Top 32%
European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies
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