How the UN Security Council Can Cause Harm: Structural Pathways, Case Evidence, and Feasible Reform

This article examines how the design and practices of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) can generate harmful outcomes—even when acting under the mandate to maintain international peace and security—through mechanisms that include the (threat of) veto, selective norm enforcement, representational imbalances, mandate–capability gaps, externalities from sanctions and authorisations, and strategic non-decisions that perpetuate impunity or prolong conflict. Conceptually, the analysis builds on scholarship on power in global governance and international authority to trace how institutional rules and informal practices produce material and normative effects that can inadvertently harm civilian populations, erode the legitimacy of the UN, and exacerbate insecurity. Methodologically, the study adopts a structured, focused comparison across six emblematic cases—Rwanda (1994), Srebrenica (1995), Iraq sanctions (1990–2003), Libya (2011–), Syria (2011–), and Yemen (2015–)—with brief vignettes on DPRK and Afghanistan to show cross-case variation in mechanisms of harm and to identify design–practice mismatches that are recurrent across settings. The article then articulates feasible reform pathways: calibrated veto restraint, mandate–capability alignment, systematic humanitarian carve-outs and compliance governance for sanctions, accountability architectures for authorisations and peace operations, and representational changes that improve perceived and actual legitimacy. While structural constraints remain formidable, recent innovations—such as the General Assembly’s “veto initiative” (A/RES/76/262) and the Security Council’s cross-regime humanitarian carve-out (S/RES/2664)—illustrate a moving frontier of feasible change. The conclusion argues for incremental but cumulative institutionalisation of harm-reduction norms and practices as the most realistic route to improving the Council’s performance in the coming decade (Barnett & Duvall, 2005; Hurd, 2017; Weiss, 2016). Keywords: United Nations Security Council. Veto. Sanctions. Humanitarian harm. Legitimacy. Institutional design. Global governance. Reform.