An Iconoclastic Interpretation of Hypotheses in the <i>Posterior Analytics</i>

Abstract In the Posterior Analytics , there are at least three types of first principle from which the demonstrative sciences proceed: axioms, definitions, and hypotheses. Of these, it is perhaps most difficult to pin down what Aristotle means by a hypothesis (ὑπόθεσις). Traditionally, hypotheses have been understood as distinct existence claims (‘S exists’), yet this interpretation has significant problems, partly resulting from Aristotle’s seemingly contradictory characterizations of hypotheses (characterizations written off as ‘nontechnical’ by traditionalists). Despite these problems, however, the traditional interpretation has persisted, as its challengers have struggled to offer a compelling alternative. This paper argues for an interpretation of hypotheses that centers on their interplay with definitions. On my view, both definitions and hypotheses are predicative propositions (‘P belongs to S’) serving as premises in demonstrative syllogisms. They are distinct insofar as in definitions the predicate (a definiens) inheres in the ‘what it is’ of the subject, whereas in hypotheses the subject inheres in the ‘what it is’ of the predicate (an in-virtue-of-itself accident of that subject). Together, definitions and hypotheses bring about a demonstrative conclusion that very much resembles the hypothesis. This interpretation, while admittedly iconoclastic, is more consistent than the traditional one with more of what Aristotle has to say about hypotheses throughout the Posterior Analytics .