Husserl on Perception

Abstract A growing body of scholarship examines whether Husserl’s account of perception should be read as disjunctivist or conjunctivist. Focusing on the Logical Investigations , this paper defends a conciliatory interpretation: Husserl’s view incorporates elements of both. At the level of descriptive psychology, perceptual acts are individuated by their intentional essence—quality and matter—supporting conjunctivism. Yet Husserlian epistemology, centered on the notion of fulfillment, requires object-dependent intuitive contents for perceptual knowledge, which marks an essential difference between veridical and non-veridical cases, thereby aligning with disjunctivism. Drawing on recent work in the philosophy of perception, I resolve this tension by distinguishing between coarse-grained content relevant to psychological description and explanation and fine-grained representational content, which incorporates context-bound elements relevant for perceptual knowledge. I argue that this strategy not only proves useful in the contemporary context, but also finds support within Husserl’s own approach to perception and perceptual knowledge in the Logical Investigations .