Alignment statecraft and alignment dilemma:The causes of hedging under US-China competitionin Latin America’s digital infrastructure

What compels states to show explicit alignment strategies during great power competition? Building on the balance of threat theory and hedging literature, we argue the primary trigger is not the rise of a great power or rivalry itself, but Negative Alignment Statecraft (NAS): the use of economic or security coercion by a great power to limit a third state’s engagement with its rival. We contend that NAS creates an Alignment Dilemma and forces targeted states to clarify their positions. To test this, we conduct a comparative analysis of two sectors in Brazil, Chile, and Mexico with growing Chinese presence: 5G/4G antennas and data centers. Where NAS was present, the countries explicitly hedged. Where it was not, hedging—if it existed—remained passive or hidden. Our findings contribute to ongoing debates about the causes of hedging by specifying a mechanism that pushes states toward active alignment strategies. But this raises a further problem we term Schrödinger’s Alignment: a condition in which it is analytically unclear whether a state is pursuing a hidden alignment strategy or no strategy at all.