Computational Experiential Monism (CEM): Dissolving the Hard Problem of Consciousness

This article presents a novel panexperientialist-computational theory that dissolves the "hard problem" of consciousness. We argue that subjective experience is not an emergent product of matter, but its intrinsic nature (The Identity Postulate). The hard problem arises from a categorical error: the projection of a "marker of inertness"—a cognitive heuristic that models the world as non-experiential—onto the brain itself. The framework is built on five core postulates: (1) Experience-Matter Identity, (2) The Marker of Inertness, (3) Phenomenal Specificity by Pattern, (4) Ownership Attribution Algorithms, and (5) The Dissolution of the Hard Problem. We extend this foundation with a theory of "Experiential Sets," which resolves the combination problem and addresses the phylogenetic threshold of consciousness. The theory generates testable predictions in neuroscience and artificial intelligence, including the "Cyborg Test" for substrate-independent consciousness. This is the initially published version of the article.Keywords:consciousness, hard problem, panpsychism, panexperientialism, neuroscience, artificial intelligence, philosophy of mind