Maximum and minimum core payoffs for supermodular multisided assignment markets with local monotonicity
We give formulas to obtain the maximum and minimum core payoffs for supermodular multisided assignment markets satisfying a local monotonicity condition. These formulas are obtained directly from the multisided array of data and we provide a core allocation where these bounds are attained. Similar formulas are known from Eriksson et al. (2000) for the bilateral Becker’s assortative assignment.
Institutions
- Universitat de Barcelona (ES)
- Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (ES)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Discrete Applied Mathematics
- Published
- 2025-10-15
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2025.10.006
- Primary Topic
- Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00