On bullshit and lies: For a responsibility-based approach

Abstract This paper aims to contribute to clarifying both the concept of bullshit and some debates surrounding this phenomenon. Despite significant interest in the topic, philosophers have yet to reach a consensus on how to define bullshit. The central questions are: what does it mean to be indifferent to the truth – a key feature of bullshit – and why does this indifference differ from lying? I propose a taxonomy of bullshit examples and an account based on the concept of discursive responsibility, offering a comprehensive overview that fills a gap in the literature. Discursive responsibility usually pushes speakers to care about truth. While liars must assume this responsibility, bullshitters remain indifferent to it. I also argue that bullshitters, unlike liars, enjoy a type of tolerance that allows them to evade responsibility. Thus, the study of bullshit will involve analyzing the factors that enable this kind of tolerance. I highlight three factors that may be at play: context, the construction of the utterance, and the speaker’s social position. Bullshitters often exploit these factors to evade responsibility, which suggests that bullshit is not only a linguistic phenomenon but also a social and political one.