Extending Speech Act Theory: Formalizing the Sovereign Act as a New Illocutionary Category

This paper formalizes an extension of Speech Act Theory (SAT) by introducing a new type of illocutionary act: the sovereign act. Drawing on the foundational work of Searle and Vanderveken in Foundations of Illocutionary Logic and Meaning and Speech Acts, the sovereign act is presented not as a rejection of existing illocutionary types (assertive, commissive, directive, declarative, and expressive) but as a revelation of a category that operates without justificatory preconditions. The sovereign act is defined as an arbitrary imposition that suspends the demand for legitimacy, achieving its illocutionary point through ungrounded lucidity. We deduce its elements—illocutionary point, mode of achievement, propositional content, preparatory conditions, sincerity conditions, and degree of strength—and analyze its conditions of success, satisfaction, and direction of fit. The sovereign act addresses the infinite regress in traditional declarations, offering a post-epistemic alternative for language use. Implications for philosophy of language and interdisciplinary applications are discussed.