Evolutionary Game Theory Modeling of Risks in Dating Strategies

Contemporary college dating culture presents a complex ecosystem where students navigate competing strategies amid digital signaling, peer influence, and evolving social norms. This study applies evolutionary game theory to model dating behavior among college students, examining how four distinct strategies, namely Committer, Avoidant, Explorer, and Manipulator, compete and evolve within campus social networks. Using survey data from 81 Dartmouth College undergraduates, we constructed payoff matrices incorporating compatibility preferences, emotional satisfaction, and reciprocal desirability to analyze strategic interactions and long-term stability. Our empirical data analysis reveals striking patterns of strategic instability and convergence. While Committer and Avoidant strategies demonstrate evolutionary stability, Explorer strategies exhibit chronic instability with 61.5% of members making multiple strategic changes. Manipulator strategies prove universally unsustainable, disappearing entirely by senior year. Nash equilibrium analysis indicates the current population (mixed strategy population where all 4 co-exist) exists in disequilibrium, explaining why 59.3% of students change dating strategies over time according to our survey data. Longitudinal data confirms mathematical predictions, showing convergence toward two dominant strategies by senior year: 48.6% Committers and 45.7% Avoidants. Significantly, our research identifies universal emotional dissatisfaction across all strategies, suggesting that strategic choice reflects risk management and identity signaling rather than happiness optimization. These findings contribute to evolutionary psychology literature while offering practical insights for understanding modern relationship dynamics in digitally-mediated social environments.