The Boundaries of a Lawyer’s Freedom of Expression

In a democratic society, the restriction of a lawyer’s freedom of expression may be justified only in exceptional cases, accompanied by adequate procedural safeguards and subject to a number of necessary preconditions. The paper examines the scope of lawyer’s freedom of expression in view of its key principles and within the prism of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights in terms of its content, form of expression, purpose, the circumstances of the case, and the overall context. The focus is placed on the challenges present in Georgian law, particularly on the deficiencies concerning the qualitative standards of the legal provisions used as a basis for interfering with a lawyer’s freedom of expression, the shortcomings in judicial practice, and the lack of adequate procedural safeguards. The conclusion outlines the measures to be undertaken to ensure effective legal practice in Georgia, in light of the growing risks to the lawyer’s role in the administration of justice and the erosion of public trust in the legal profession.