Labor market institutions and preferences for redistribution

In highly segmented labor markets uneven distributions of risk across worker groups can lead to varying demands for redistribution. We study the impact of economic insecurity, as- sociated with temporary contracts, on individual preferences for income redistribution. The Spanish labor market, where one-third of workers are employed under temporary contracts, provides a good context for this study. We use data from the European Social Survey from 2002 to 2018 and apply an exact matching methodology to isolate the effect of the contract type from other individual characteristics. Our results reveal that temporary contracts lead to an 11 percent increase in the likelihood of strongly supporting redistribution, irrespective of individuals’ education level or sex. In terms of age, the effect is concentrated among individuals aged 40 and above, indicating an increase in risk perception when this contrac- tual figure is perceived as a dead end. During periods of macroeconomic uncertainty, when insecurity extends beyond the contract type, redistribution preferences of workers with tem- porary and permanent contracts equalize due to a substantial increase in the preferences of those with an ex-ante more secure labor market position. Our results provide evidence that economic insecurity caused by the design of labor market institutions is a strong determinant of redistribution preferences.