A Sword of Damocles Hanging Over Officials: Effects of the River Chief System on Water Pollution Control and Promotion Probability

The government plays a vital role in water pollution control in developing countries. Chinese local governments have launched the River Chief System (RCS) to reduce water pollution. The case of Taihu Lake in Wuxi City, which had major issues with water pollution, demonstrates how the RCS can address responsibility decentralization by changing the governance structure and creating political incentives for local government leaders. This study quantitatively evaluates the RCS policy effect using the difference-in-difference method by matching water quality and prefecture-level city data in China from 2004 to 2014. The results show that the RCS improves water quality. Furthermore, incorporating water quality metrics into the cadre evaluation system significantly enhances officials’ promotion prospects. Moreover, leaders are highly incentivized to achieve targets directly associated with their promotion. Placing political pressure on leaders by hanging the sword of Damocles over them is an effective strategy in governing the local commons.