Applying Axelrod’s experiment to hierarchical groups: the advantage of cooperation

Purpose The evolutionary advantage of cooperation between peers was demonstrated by Robert Axelrod, who drew four “moral rules” from his Prisoner’s Dilemma tournaments, embodied in the so-called “Tit for Tat” strategy. However, the Prisoner’s Dilemma is a very simple model, and such results are not generalizable to a vast set of more complex contexts, such as that of organizations. Our purpose is to design a similar tournament, based on a more complex and hierarchical model, to observe the efficacy of cooperative behavior within organizations. Design/methodology/approach We use agent-based modeling to simulate a round-robin tournament for the model of Triadic Supervision, which aims to represent the dynamics of hierarchical groups of collaborators placed under the responsibility of a common supervisor. Findings We find evidence that Axelrod’s four altruistic rules also apply in this context, leading to its most successful strategies. Originality/value We conclude that Axelrod’s four rules may indeed constitute the evolutionary basis for successful human cooperation in a broader range of situations than previously believed, including intra-organizational dynamics. We draw a few possible implications for the field of Human Resources management, such as the role of the frequency of feedback in defining organizational climate; a further validation of the Management by Objectives model; and the importance to accompany the implementation of telecommuting with solutions capable of maintaining healthy relationships between colleagues.