The Party's Court or the Court for the Parties: An Empirical Assessment of the Fifth Judicial Reform in China

This article empirically assesses the effectiveness of China’s Fifth Judicial Reform, which was implemented from 2019 to 2023. The Reform endeavored to balance upholding the absolute leadership of the Party and ensuring the independent exercise of judicial power by the courts, as well as to realize the people’s expectations for fairness and justice. To date, empirical research on China’s Fifth Judicial Reform has been relatively limited. This article examines in detail the practical effects of the Reform through the perspective of frontline judges. The findings suggest that the courts have made some progress toward realizing the aims of the Reform. The courts have reinforced the absolute leadership of the Party. Moreover, the Reform has provided litigants with more convenient litigation services and established a remuneration system closely linked to the performance of judges. Thirty-eight per cent of the judges considered the Judicial Reform to be very effective. However, the analysis also reveals some underlying problems with the Reform. Despite the Reform’s aims of strengthening judicial independence, the symbiosis between the Party and the judiciary has become more pronounced. Local government interference in the judiciary still exists. Judicial openness has regressed, with fewer judgments being published. Judges also face pressure from litigants for false accusations. The construction of smart courts remains inadequate in terms of technological updates, data security, and privacy protection. Chinese courts still need further reforms to strengthen the role of the court in the administration of justice.