A novel cyber resilient distributed secondary control strategy against FDI attacks in Islanded AC microgrids

• Proposing a novel cyber-resilient distributed secondary control strategy to enhance the resilience/performance of MGs against FDI attacks • FDI attacks consisting of attacks on communication links and actuators • Reducing exchanged data among DG units compared to recent studies • The advantages of the proposed method: reducing the required communication bandwidth and implementation costs, lower computational complexity and enhancing stability and security of MG The conventional distributed secondary controllers are commonly employed for frequency synchronization and voltage restoration in microgrids (MGs). Nevertheless, with the development of communication networks in MGs as a cyber-physical system (CPS), MGs are vulnerable against cyber threats. Therefore, designing a cyber resilient distributed secondary control against cyber-attacks is very important. The attacks target the security of MG through injecting false data into communication links between the secondary controllers of various units or hijacking the inputs to the secondary controllers via actuator manipulation. So, this paper presents a novel distributed secondary control strategy designed to enhance the performance of islanded AC MGs against cyber-attacks on communication links and actuators. In other words, this paper proposes a fully distributed control architecture to reduce vulnerability that improves the performance of secondary controllers in the presence of false data injection (FDI) cyber-attacks. The effectiveness of the proposed method is evaluated and shown through various scenarios in a 4-bus MG in MATLAB/Simulink environment. The suggested method involves lower computational complexity relative to existing resilient methods, which leads to faster control response.